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The Generalized Empirical Method (GEM) as 
outlined by Henman (2013) initially seems a co-
gent approach that should be adopted by cogni-
tive neuroscientists. However, some weaknesses 
in the presumptions of this method in light of 
modern neuroscience research may challenge its 
validity. As I am currently working on mapping 
cerebral-cerebellar networks using fMRI, I am 
intrigued by the practical utility of the GEM in 
experimental work. 
In defi ning numerous mental acts as basic ele-
ments of a theory of cognition, Henman (2013) 
asserts that a “detailed account of [these] men-
tal acts increases the specifi cation of locales and 
events in the brain” (p. 53). If the intention here is 
to specify distinct brain regions for distinct men-
tal acts, then the assumption is being made that 
these brain regions uniquely sub-serve/mediate 
corresponding mental acts. In this sense, even 
if scans could “record different rates of synap-
tic activity” (Henman, 2013, p. 53) (which they 
actually cannot since metabolic measures of the 
fMRI signal refl ect local fi eld potentials instead 
of synaptic fi ring rates; see review by Ekstrom, 
2010) or reveal combinations of brain regions, 
the problem of over specifi cation remains. That 
is, it would be uneconomical and computation-
ally demanding for the brain to delegate so many 
unique areas for specifi c mental acts.
Brain networks possess tremendous modular-
ity and overlapping functional zones. For exam-
ple, the Executive Network correlates with many 
tasks involving mental fl exibility and working 
memory (Seeley et al., 2007). This network 
would correspond to more than one mental act 
as Henman (2013) has defi ned, such as “judge-
ment” and “planning” (p. 51). If a supposition of 
the GEM relies on parcellating many brain areas 
for many mental acts, this would ignore com-
monality- a central principle in neuroscience. If 
this were the case, how would we organize such 
enormous amounts data in order to arrive at a 
parsimonious theory of cognition?
Collaboration among molecular biologists, 
psychologists, biochemists, and physicists is im-
perative for cognitive neuroscience to progress. 
Therefore, all independent lines of inquiry, from 
microscopy to large scale neuroimaging, must 
in one way or another contribute to a theory of 
thinking. Of course, brain scanning cannot sole-
ly explicate such a theory. For instance, under-
standing disordered thinking in schizophrenia 
is dependent on our understanding of the brain 
from these multiple lines of inquiry. Contrary to 
Henman’s (2013) suggestion however, this does 
not mean that “more specifi c and detailed de-
scriptions of cerebral activity” (p. 49) are need-
ed. What is necessary at this point is a broader 
theoretical framework in which to contextualize 
the plethora of scattered data (Tandon, Nasrallah 
and Keshavan, 2009). Only then can effective 
and relevant therapeutic protocols develop.
Finally, brain network connectivity is ex-
tremely dynamic and experimenters must have 
a priori assumptions to obtain desired signals. 
This is true for statistical thresholding and reso-
lutions in fMRI scans to select what to analyze 
and at what signifi cance (Lindquist, 2008). As 
a result, the data of the scan is imbued with the 
data of the experimenter. The subjectivity of the 
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experimenter and all his/her steps of contempla-
tion about experimental design becomes an in-
trinsic quality in the objectivity of the scan data 
itself.
Henman’s attempt at re-conceptualizing the 
modern approach to experimentation in cogni-
tive neuroscience is commendable. I hope the 
concerns I have brought to bare will improve 
the GEM for further consideration, as it is in-
teresting and not totally untenable. The GEM is 
at least trying to answer the question too many 
neuroscientists comfortably disregard: what can 
we really learn from scans anyways?
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